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INTRODUCTION 
The study of content effects on reasoning has been one of the 
principal lines of investigation in conditional inference. One of the most 
widely used paradigms for studying the importance of factors related to the 
role of pragmatic knowledge, which subjects have with regard to the 
content of arguments, is a metainference task: Wason’s selection task 
(Wason, 1966, 1968). 
In the 1970’s various investigations revealed a facilitating effect in 
executing the task, when thematic content was used instead of the original 
abstract version, or formal content, with letters and numbers (Wason and 
Shapiro, 1971; Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi and Sonino Legrenzi, 1972; 
Bracewell and Hidi, 1974; Gilhooly and Falconer, 1974; Van Duyne, 
1974). However, not all of these investigations were able to duplicate these 
facilitating effects, from Manktelow and Evan’s (1979) now classic study 
(see Evans, 1982, 1989; Wason 1983, and Newstead and Evans 1995, for 
revisions). 
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Despite this, certain consensus has existed since the mid-1980’s in 
literature considering that daily reasoning is "content-dependent: 
dependent, that is, on content which evokes relevant knowledge from the 
memory" (Manktelow and Over, 1990, p. 111). However, there is no 
consensus between the different theoretical viewpoints on how to explain 
the influence of factors related to the content and context of reasoning. 
The most serious criticism about the syntactic theories of formal 
rules are precisely directed at their weakness in being able to explain these 
factors in subjects’ reasoning (Evans, 1991; Johnson-Laird and Byrne, 
1991; Evans, Newstead and Byrne, 1993). 
In the 1980’s theoretical points of view appeared that did not suggest 
systems of rules of a general nature in reasoning, but instead a specific 
group of rules of authority, sensitive to the context and that could be 
applied to particular aspects of daily life. Cheng and Holyoak’s theory of 
pragmatic schemas (1985, 1989) and the theory of social contract 
(Cosmides, 1985, 1989) are included among these. From here on two 
debates appear in literature: a) pragmatic schemas vs. presentation effects 
of the task, and b) pragmatic schemas vs. social contract. We will 
concentrate on the first of these, the most relevant in this context  
The theory of schemas proposes that certain effects of content 
facilitation in Wason’s selection task are due to the use of pragmatic 
schemas or rules that are sensitive to the context. Some of these schemas 
refer to causal situations, and other to deontic schemas (permissions, 
obligations), that may be summed up in 4 productive rules (P1-P4 and O1-
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In the light of these suggestions, Jackson and Griggs (1990) argued 
that the facilitating effect in the selection task was due to the combination 
of two presentation factors in the task: 1) the use of explicit denials in 
presenting the not-p, not-q, and 2) the presence of a context which 
facilitated checking violation of the rule. The results of their investigations, 
where no facilitation effects were registered when there were no explicit 
negatives, as well as those of other experiments (Griggs and Jackson, 
1990), where an improvement in the performance of the selection task was 
registered with abstract tasks and violation instructions, corroborate their 
proposals. They explained both results in terms of the heuristic-analytic 
process theory (Evans, 1984, 1989) in such a way that the violation 
instruction provoked a focusing of attention on those cards that composed 
the correct answer. 
Girotto, Mazzoco and Cherubini (1992) carried out a series of 
experiments of abstract content, manipulating the presence/absence of 
explicit denials in the cards. The presence of negatives was not necessary 
for the facilitating effect to be produced. For these authors, it would not be 
an operation of a heuristic of linguistic relevance, but instead an analytic 
decision, related to pragmatic relevance. They concluded that their results 
could be explained by using pragmatic schemas. 
Theories also exist which propose that reasoning does not rely on 
rules. In this respect Johnson-Laird put forward a semantic focus of 
reasoning: the Theory of Mental Models (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Johnson-
Laird and Byrne, 1991). Likewise, Jonathan Evans proposed the Theory of 
Heuristic/Analytic processes, where the existence of a preconscious 
selection of certain characteristics of the task is defended, before analytical 
reasoning is produced (Evans, 1984, 1989). 
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More concretely, Evans (1995) points out that it is necessary to 
describe the effects of the content that may or may not facilitate its correct 
performance, based on selection elements of a linguistic and pragmatic 
nature. In the same way, we studied in this experiment not only the nature 
of the content but also the influence that other variables may exert on 
subjects’ reasoning, related to their experience and previous knowledge, the 
type of instructions they receive, the scenario about which they are 
reasoning, the inclusion in the rule of deontic terms, and the use of explicit 
denials. 
The objectives of this experiment were: 1) To study in greater depth 
the role of content on subjects’ reasoning in Wason’s Selection Task, 2) 
analyse the influence of the availability of the scenario from which the 
subjects would have to contemplate the conclusions that were produced, 3) 
to check if the experimental instructions received by the subjects have an 
influence on their ability to reason in the four card task, and how much this 
possible influence is modified in relation to the content and/or scenario 
which they are reasoning, and 4) analyse the possible influence of variables 
of a linguistic character, such as the introduction of explicit denials and the 
use of deontic terms in the conditional rule. 
In order to reach these objectives, we gave the subjects, in the 
framework of accessible or non-available scenarios, three different versions 
of Wason’s selection task: a formal or abstract version, and two thematic 
versions (Thematic-1: permission; Thematic-2: obligation). In some cases 
the subjects first solved the abstract version and then the concrete tasks, 
and in other cases the thematic versions were those that were first 
presented. In order to solve each task, the subjects had to select the card or 
cards that they should turn over, either to check if the rule was true or to  
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find out if this had been violated. 
Our empirical expectations were the following: 
1. We do not identify with syntactic suggestions that have been taken 
up by defenders of natural logic and formal systems of rules. On the 
contrary, we would situate ourselves closer to theoretical suggestions that 
defend not only the importance of the content, but also of other semantic, 
contextual and pragmatic variables of human reasoning. We therefore hope 
to obtain significant interactive effects between the content and other 
variables, of those types previously mentioned. 
2. One would expect a facilitating effect of the violation instructions 
in thematic versions of the task from the results of other studies, where the 
influence of the type of instructions that subjects receive on their reasoning 
strategies was analysed (Griggs, 1984; Valentine, 1985; Chrostowski & 
Griggs, 1985; Yachanin, 1986; Griggs, 1989, among others). However, we 
also hope that there is a facilitating effect brought about by the instructions 
in the abstract version of the test. In line with previous empirical results, 
(Yachanin, 1983, experiment 1; Griggs and Jackson, 1990; Valiña and 
colleagues, 1995, among others) we believe that those subjects who are 
reasoning about the formal version and receive violation instructions will 
receive very high logical indices, and, definitively, a higher number of 
successes, when compared to those subjects who, reasoning about the same 
version of the task, receive instructions for checking the truth or falseness 
of the rule. 
3. If, as Evans (1984, 1989) put forward in his "theory of the double 
heuristic-analytic process", there is a previous phase to analytic reasoning 
in subjects who activate heuristic strategies to select relevant information, 
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then one may expect that when offered the possibility of activating certain 
heuristics, and more concretely, when they reason in available contexts, 
then they will present a different type of performance to when they do so in 
non-available contexts. 
However, as the previously mentioned author commented, 
availabylity is a necessary condition, although not enough for heuristic 
selection of relevant cues in the task. Therefore, we expected that 
availability would, in turn, be modulated by other factors, such as the 
nature of the content or the type of instructions which are received (Pollard 
and Evans, 1987; Evans, 1995). We expected higher levels of errors when 
the subjects consider non-available contexts with the abstract version of the 
task, or when they reason about this type of context and also receive 
instructions on checking the rule. 
 4. As with the results of previous empirical results, such as those of 
Reich and Ruth (1982), Griggs & Cox (1983), Evans (1992; 1993; 1995) 
and Oaksford & Stenning (1992), among others, we consider that in the 
thematic versions of the task its relevance may be fundamentally 
determined by pragmatic, more than linguistic, types of clues. Thus, unlike 
Manktelow and Evan’s results (1979), we expected lower indices of 
matching when the subjects reason about realistic contents than when they 













190 students at college level (113 females and 77 males; mean age 
16 years 7 months),  in  Santiago  de  Compostela  (Spain)  volunteered  to  
participate  in  this  experiment . They  had  no  previous  experience  of 
this task, nor any training in logic. 
  
Design 
A 2 x 2 x 2 x 3 factorial design with repeated measures on the last 
factor was used. The four factors were: availability of scenario (available or 
not available) x instructions (true/false version vs. violation version) x 
presentation order (Abstract-Thematic vs. Thematic-Abstract) x problem 
content (Abstract, with letters and numbers; Thematic-1, a rule expressing 
a law, equivalent to permission, and Thematic-2, a rule expressing a traffic 
regulation, equivalent to an obligation.) 
Frequencies of selection combinations for the three problems, Logic 
Index and Matching Index (Pollard and Evans, 1987) were used. 
 
Materials 
Eight test booklets were made, each containing an instruction page 
and three different selection tasks (Wason, 1966, 1968), presented on 
separate pages. In the middle of the booklets, the subjects were asked to 
imagine themselves as a person with a familiar or available profession for 
them (for example, "Imagine you are a lawyer"). The selection of available 
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or non-available professions was carried out, based on previous 
investigations (Valiña, 1985, 1988; Valiña and De Vega, 1988). 
The instructions for carrying out the task were those previously used 
by Chrostowski and Griggs (1985), Yachanin (1986), and Valiña and 
colleagues (1995). Half of the subjects received verifying instructions of 
the rule, and the other half violation instructions. 
In the condition of verification/falsification of the rule, the 
instructions were the following: 
"Your task consists of selecting cards, and only those that must be 
turned over to decide if the rule is true or false (select those cards which 
you consider necessary to turn over to check if the person carrying out the 
experiment has lied or not in relation to the composition of the rule)". 
The violation instructions were: 
"Your task consists of selecting only those cards that must be turned 
over in order to decide if the rule is being violated or not". 
Each subject received three rules, with the following types of 
content: abstract, thematic-1 (permission), and thematic-2 (obligation). The 
instructions in each condition were: 
a) Abstract: "If a Wasit card has an A on one side, then it must have 
a 3 on the other". The four cards presented to the subject were "A", "K", 
"3" and "7". 
b) Thematic-1: "If person is more than 18 years old, then he has the 
right to vote". Four cards had previously appeared, which said "20 years 
old", "16 years old", "you have the right to vote" and "you do not have the 
right to vote". In this rule a law was expressed; therefore it is similar to 
permission. Also, one of the cards included an explicit denial. 
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c) Thematic-2: "If a person rides a motorbike, then they must wear a 
helmet". The four cards that were represented were: "motorbike", "car", 
"helmet" and "cap". The rule expresses an obligation -a traffic regulation-. 
As in the abstract version, the modal verb "must" is included.  
Two different versions were made for each of the types of booklet. In 
one of these the abstract version was included at the beginning, followed by  
the two thematic versions. In the other, the thematic versions were at the 
beginning, followed by the abstract rule. 
 Finally, the order of presentation of the two thematic versions for all 
of the booklets was counterbalanced. This meant that in half of the booklets 




Subjects were assigned at random to one of four experimental 
groups: 1) Available scenario-instructions for verifying or falsifying the 
rule, 2) Available scenario-violation instructions, 3) Non-available 
scenario-instructions for verifying or falsifying the rule, and 4) Non-
available scenario-violation instructions. 
Participants were tested in groups and presented problem booklets 
containing three Wason’s selection tasks, preceded by an instruction page. 
The instructions were read to the subjects, and then they were asked to read 
them again to themselves. Questions were solicited from the subjects to 
ensure that they understood the instructions. 
Finally they were allowed to work at their own rhythm, without a 
time limit. 
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The analyses were carried out with the data from the 183 subjects, 
once those who had not completed the task had been eliminated. 
 
A) Selection of answers 
In Tables 1, 2 and 3, the distribution of frequencies of the selection 
of each card is presented, in each experimental condition, as well as the 
measurements for the logical and matching indices. In turn, Table 4 
presents the frequency of selection of individual cards for each condition, 
in the three experimental tasks. 
There are significant differences in the selection of cards with regard 
to the content of the rule. The selection of "p and not-q" (correct answer): 
(χ2  = 18.71; p<.001), is more frequent in the thematic-2 version (traffic 
regulation). In turn, in the thematic-1 version (law), this selection is even 
less frequent than in the abstract version. Also, with abstract content (letters 
and numbers) in the rule, the subjects select the cards "p and q" more (χ2  = 
19.39; p<.001). Therefore, in the non-available abstract condition, the 
frequency of selection of the correct answer increases significantly with 
regard to the available-abstract condition. However, in the thematic-
permission version, with an available scenario, the subjects select the "p 
only" card significantly more, compared to those subjects who select it in a 
non-available scenario (χ2  = 4.84; p<.05). 
Also, when the subject has to work with letters and numbers (the 
abstract version of the task), the type of instructions given to the subjects 
(checking vs. violation)  do  not  significantly  influence  the  cards  that  
are  selected. In the thematic-permission version, the subjects who receive 
verification / falsification  instructions  select  the  "p only"  card  more             
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(χ2  = 15.79; p<.01) and the cards "p and q" together (χ2  = 3.97; p<.05), 
than those who receive violation instructions. In the thematic-obligation 
version, subjects who receive checking instructions of the veracity of the 
rule tend to select the "p only" card, (χ2  = 3.90; p<.05) and "q only" card 
(χ2  = 5.59; p<.01) more than those subjects who receive violation 
instructions. 
  
 B) Logical index and Matching index 
The logical and matching indices were calculated for each of the 
three tasks. These indices give marks, according to Pollard and Evans 
(1987), in the case of the matching index, with +1 the p or q y-1 selection 
and with -1 the non-p or q selection. In the logical index, the p or non-q 
selection gave a mark of +1, and the non-p or q selection gave -1. Both 
indices vary, therefore, between +2 and -2. Tables 1, 2 and 3 shows these 
indices for each of the three tasks. ANOVAs 2 x 2 x 2 x 3 (availability x 
instructions x order x content) were made for each type of index. 
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Table 1. Mean matching, logical indices1 and selection patterns, as a  
     function of condition (abstract content). 
 
ABSTRACT  CONTENT 
 AVAILABLE NOT-AVAILABLE TOTAL
Mean 
Index 
T/F Violation Total T/F Violation Total  
Matching 1,299 0,959 1,129 1,078 0,888 0,983 1,056 
Logic 0,192 0,466 0,329 0,441 0,383 0,412 0,371 
Selection  
p 
p & q 
p & not-q* 
p & not-p 
p , not-p & q 
p , not-p, not-q 




Not-p & q 
Not-p & not-q 
q & not-q 
Not-p, q & not-q 
p, not-p, q, not-q 
Void 
5                      7 
25                  18 
4                     4 
3                     1 
1                     1 
-                      1 
3                      4 
3                      - 
1                      2 
-                      1 
2                      - 
-                       2 
-                       - 
-                       - 
-                       2 
-                       - 
8                      5 
22                  23 
7                      6 
1                      1 
-                       - 
-                       - 
1                       2 
1                       - 
-                        - 
2                        1 
-                        - 
1                        5 
1                        - 
-                         - 
1                         3 
1                         1 
1 Indices vary between +2 and -2 
* Correct selection 
 12
Wason´s selection task: Content effect, instruction effect or both? 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Table 2. Mean matching, logical indices1 and selection patterns, as a  
     function of condition (Thematic-Permission content). 
 
THEMATIC-PERMISSION CONTENT 
 AVAILABLE NOT-AVAILABLE TOTAL
Mean 
Index 
T/F Violation Total T/F Violation Total  
Matching 0,978 -0,112 0,433 0,130 0,173 0,101 0,2675 
Logic 0,000 -0,237 -0,118 0,174 0,339 -0,082 -0,100 
Selection  
p 
p & q 
p & not-q* 
p & not-p 
p, q & not-q 
p , not-p & q 




Not-p & q 
Not-p & not-q 
q & not-q 
Not-p, q & not-q 
p, not-p, q, not-q 
Void 
8                      - 
17                    6 
1                      4 
4                      2 
3                      1 
-                      1 
-                      - 
3                      1 
-                      1 
1                      4 
5                      6 
-                       8 
1                       2 
-                       1 
4                      4 
-                       2 
2                      1 
7                      9 
8                      1 
6                      3 
2                      1 
-                       - 
-                       - 
2                       2 
-                        - 
4                        4 
3                        7 
5                        5 
5                        2 
-                         - 
2                      10 
-                         2 
1 Indices vary between +2 and -2 
* Correct selection 
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Table 3. Mean matching, logical indices1 and selection patterns, as a  
     function of condition (Thematic-Obligation content). 
 
THEMATIC-OBLIGATION CONTENT 
 AVAILABLE NOT-AVAILABLE TOTAL
Mean 
Index 
T/F Violation Total T/F Violation Total  
Matching 1,192 0,712 0,952 0,891 0,722 0,806 0,879 
Logic 0,600 0,744 0,672 0,543 0,807 0,675 0,673 
Selection  
p 
p & q 
p & not-q* 
p & not-p 
p , not-p & q 
p , not-p & not-q 




Not-p & q 
Not-p & not-q 
q & not-q 
Not-p, q & not-q 
p, not-p, q & not-q 
Void 
9                      3 
21                  12 
10                  11 
1                     3 
-                      1 
-                      1 
3                      8 
2                      1 
-                      1 
-                      1 
1                      - 
-                       - 
-                       - 
-                       1 
-                       - 
-                       - 
7                      6 
14                  13 
9                    14 
2                      2 
2                      - 
-                       - 
6                       5 
3                       - 
-                        - 
1                        1 
1                        - 
1                        1 
-                        1 
-                         - 
-                         4 
-                         - 
1 Indices vary between +2 and -2 
* Correct selection 
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 Table 4. Frequency of selection of individual cards in each experimental  
               condition.  
 
  AVAILABLE NON-AVAILABLE 
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B.1.) Logical Index 
For the logical index, the principal effects of the content were 
registered (F(1.72, 300.69)=40.21; ε= .8591; p<.0001). In the Thematic-
obligation version (Thematic-2), higher logical indices were obtained    
(M= .673), followed by the abstract version of the task (M = .368). Finally, 
the lowest logical indices were registered in the Thematic-permission 
version (Thematic-1) (M= -.100). Posterior contrasts indicate significant 
differences in the selection of the correct answer between the thematic-
obligation version and the other two F(1,175) = 49.821; p< .0001, as well 
as between the abstract and thematic-permission tasks (F(1,175) = 19.40;   
p < .0001. 
Significant interactive effects have also been registered for 
instructions x content (F(1.72, 300.69) = 6.40; p< .003). Concretely, as 
may be seen in figure 1, both in the abstract and the thematic-obligation 
versions, the logical indices are higher in those subjects who receive 
violation instructions (MV = .424 and MV= .775 respectively), while in the 
thematic-permission version, higher logical indices were obtained in those 
subjects who received instructions for checking the rule (MV/F = .087), 
compared to those who receive violation instructions (MV = -.288). 
However, in this version (thematic-permission), the logical indices are 
lower than those obtained both in the thematic-obligation version and the 
abstract version of the task. 
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Figure 1. Interactive effects of the type of instructions and the type of  
        content on the logical index 



































      
         VIOLATION INSTRUCTIONS                        THEMATIC-1: THEMATIC-PERMISSION 
         VERIFICATION INSTRUCTIONS                  THEMATIC-2: THEMATIC-OBLIGATION 
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B.2.) Matching Index 
Regarding the matching index, significant effects were also 
registered in the content (F(1.91, 333.68) = 42.08; ε= .95338; p< .0001). 
Concretely, the highest matching index was obtained in the abstract version 
of the task (MABST = 1.056), followed by the thematic-obligation version 
(MTHEM-2 = .879), with the lowest matching indices being registered when 
the subjects reasoned about a rule expressing a law (MTHEM-1= .267). 
Similarly, a significant effect was obtained with the instructions 
variable, (F(1,175) = 9.71; p< .002). Subjects obtaining higher matching 
indices were those who were given instructions for checking the rule   
(MV/F = .928), compared to those who received violation instruction       
(MV = .557). 
An important interactive effect was also registered for availability x 
instructions (F(1,175) = 4.88; p< .028). Faced with an available scenario, 
subjects who had received instructions for checking the rule achieved 
matching indices that duplicated those obtained by those subjects who, with 
the same scenario, had received violation indices for the rule (MV/F = 1.156 
compared to MV= .519). However, when the subjects considered the 
framework of a non-available scenario, the differences between the 
averages for the matching indices that were obtained with both types of 
instructions were reduced significantly, (MV/F = .699 compared to            
MV = .594). 
A significant interactive effect was also observed in order x content 
(F(1.91, 333.68) = 5.27; p < .006; ε= .95338). In the abstract and thematic-
obligation versions, the highest matching indices were obtained when the 
thematic task was carried out firstly, followed by the abstract task            
(M = 1.211  and  M = .933 respectively), while in the thematic-permission  
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version, lower matching indices were produced by those subjects who were 
initially presented with the thematic task (M = .200) compared to those 
who were firstly presented with the abstract task (M = .419). 
 
DISCUSSION 
A) Content Effect 
The highest logical indices were registered when the subjects 
reasoned about a thematic version of the rule whose content expressed a 
traffic regulation ("if a person rides a motorbike, then they must wear a 
helmet"). Worse performance was not registered with the abstract content, 
but when the subjects carried out a thematic version whose content 
expressed a law ("if a person is older than 18 then they have the right to 
vote). Therefore, the thematic content of the rule only appears to improve 
the subjects’ performance in the selection task in a few cases. Whatever the 
situation, the subjects’ reasoning is not independent from thematic factors, 
as is defended by models of formal rules. Neither are they easily explicable 
through alternative theoretical suggestions that justify the subjects’ 
performance based on the activation of counterexamples specifically 
evoked by the subjects from memory (for example, see Griggs & Cox’s 
perspective, 1982; Griggs, 1983, regarding the key elements of memory 
and analogue reasoning, or Pollard’s theory of accessibility, 1982). 
The Theory of Pragmatic Schemas defends the fact that subjects 
reason by applying pragmatic schemas of reasoning, that are activated in 
contexts that allow them to evoke situations of permission, obligation 
etcetera. For Cheng and Holyoak (1985, 1989; Cheng and colleagues, 
1986; Holyoak and Cheng, 1995), all of the contents that have facilitated a 
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correct performance of the selection task evoke some kind of schema. 
When the subjects are reasoning with the abstract version presented in this 
experiment, they could be activating a pragmatic schema of obligation, 
elicited from the contextual situation in which the task is developed. The 
result is an improved performance than that registered in previous 
investigations with the original abstract version, in which this type of 
activation did not appear to be possible. 
In our experiment, the abstract version we have used is a "modified 
version" of the classic task (Wason, 1966). The fundamental modification 
is the inclusion of the deontic imperative modal "must" in the conditional 
rule ("if a Wasit card has an A on one side then it must have a 3 on the 
other"). In this way the subjects are not reasoning with an arbitrary abstract 
version but instead, following the terminology used in schema theory, by 
authors such as Manktelow and Over (1990, 1991, 1992), with an abstract 
deontic version which expresses a conditional obligation. 
Also, the thematic version which we have called "thematic-
obligation" may be included in the same schema of conditional obligation 
as the previous abstract version: "if a person rides a motorbike then they 
must wear a helmet"; generally, "if the precondition is satisfied, then the 
action must be carried out". 
Finally, the thematic version called "thematic-permission" presented 
a schema that we could refer to as a "schema of conditional permission": "if 
a person is more than 18 years old, then they have the right to vote", ("if 
the precondition is satisfied, then the action may be carried out"). 
 Thus, based on the theory of pragmatic schemas, and particularly on 
Holyoak and Cheng’s studies (1995), the three versions which are 
developed  could  be  assimilated,  respectively,  to  the  O1  rule  of  the  
 20
Wason´s selection task: Content effect, instruction effect or both? 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
obligation schema (abstract deontic version and thematic-obligation 
version) and to the P3 rule of the permission schema (thematic-permission 
version). 
If we analyse the frequency of the selection of cards in the three 
versions of the task, then we observe that some of our results are consistent 
with those of Holyoak and Cheng (1995), and may be explained within the 
framework of the theory of pragmatic schemas. However, we also obtained 
some results that are not easily explicable by way of the basic principles of 
schema theory. 
More specifically, the authors quoted found a higher percentage of 
subjects who selected the "p" and "not-q" cards individually and "p and 
not-q" together, when the rule used could be assimilated with the O1 rule 
belonging to the conditional obligation schema. Similarly, these selections 
were less frequent when the rule corresponded to P3 in the conditional 
permission schema. In this rule these authors, in keeping with their 
predictions, registered a higher percentage of selections of the cards "not 
p", "q" on its own and "not p and q" together. 
If we look at Tables 1, 2 and 3, where we offer the frequency of 
selection of the cards relative to the content of the task, then we can see 
that in this case our results follow on from those obtained by Holyoak and 
Cheng (1995). In the version of the task that conforms to the P3 rule, the 
"thematic-permission" version, the "not p", "q" and "not p and q" cards are 
more frequent than in the two versions that conform to the O1 rule of 
conditional obligation. Effectively, in the thematic-permission version, 
these cards were selected by 13, 8 and 21 subjects respectively. However, 
the "not p" card on its own was selected by 4 subjects in the deontic 
abstract version and by 3 subjects in the thematic-obligation version; the 
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"q" card was chosen by 4 subjects in the first version and 6 in the second. 
Finally, the "not p and q" cards were selected by 2 subjects both in the 
deontic abstract version and the thematic-obligation version. 
Therefore, if we focus on the selection of "p and not q" cards, which 
make up the logically correct answer, our results are in line with the 
predictions of the theory of pragmatic schemas and coincide with those 
obtained by Holyoak and Cheng (1995). Both in the abstract and thematic-
obligation versions, both of which conform to the O1 rule, 21 and 44 correct 
selections were obtained respectively, compared to the 14 which were 
registered in the version corresponding to the P3 rule of the permissive 
schema. In effect, "if a stated rule is matched to Rule P1 of the permission 
schema or to Rule O1 of the obligation schema, then the so-called "logical" 
selection of p and not-q will indeed be facilitated. But precisely the 
opposite selection pattern will be encouraged if the stated rule is instead 
mapped on to Rule P3 of the permission schema". (Holyoak and Cheng, 
1995, p. 85) 
However, it is difficult to explain the high matching indices which 
were registered in the deontic abstract version, which conforms to the same 
rule as the thematic-obligation version. Specifically, "the theory predicts 
that performance on the selection task will be facilitated (i.e. be in accord 
with standard logic) when the stated rule has content that evokes a schema, 
and the correspondence between the stated rule and the schema rules is 
such that the latter map on to rules of standard logic" (Holyoak and Cheng, 
1995, p. 69). Furthermore, the theory of pragmatic schemas does not offer 
any solution for the matching bias, nor is any type of prediction carried out 
regarding ‘selective attention’ that the subjects realise with the "p and q" 
cards,  which,  as  we  have  previously  shown,  determine  the  matching  
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In our opinion, when the subjects reason about the phrase "if a 
person is older then 18, then they have the right to vote", then they know 
that in their empirical world "if a person has the right to vote they need to 
be at least 18 years old". On the contrary, when they reason about the rule 
"if a person rides a motorbike then they must wear a helmet", then the 
development of a biconditional interpretation by the subjects diminishes 
substantially (only 4 subjects selected all of the cards). In this case, the 
subjects know that "if a person rides a motorbike then necessarily he must 
wear a helmet", and similarly they also know different situations in daily 
life where "a person can wear a helmet without this necessarily implying 
that he must ride a motorbike". In this case, we observed a reduction of 
biconditional interpretations, with conditional interpretation being more 
frequent, and from which the correct selection ("p and not q") was made by 
44 subjects. 
We definitively coincide with Holyoak and Cheng in showing that it 
is the activation of pragmatic types of strategies, and not logical 
mechanisms, which appears to be responsible for way the subjects carry out 
the selection task. However, perhaps as proposed by Evans and Clibbens 
(1995), the proposal of the theory of schemas contains production rules 
which "seems to us to be over-elaborate, and unnecessary to account for 
the data" (p. 320). Generally, in keeping with these authors, and from our 
results, we would question if the theory of pragmatic schemas or the theory 
of social contract may give us direct evidence of the process of reasoning, 
being based upon the systematic application of production rules (and/or 
rules of social contract). 
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B) The importance of the deontic content 
Manktelow and Over (1991) particularly underlined the influence of 
deontic reasoning in the subjects’ performance in the selection task. For 
these authors, the theory of pragmatic reasoning schemas does not allow 
deontic reasoning to be explained as these schemas contain deontic terms 
such as "must" and "may", that have not been analysed, in principle, by this 
theory. 
The authors put forward an explanation of the subjects’ performance 
in Wason’s task, based on the elaboration of mental models, while putting 
particular emphasis on two fundamental questions: the influence at 
semantic level of the inclusion of deontic terms in the rule, and the 
influence of the concrete perspective of the subject who is reasoning. 
According to Manktelow and Over (1991), subjects at times interpret some 
conditionals as deontic conditionals, and consequently, when they solve the 
task, they check if the rule has been broken. This strategy, which is 
precisely what guides the subject towards a correct reasoning, would allow 
the superiority of the percentage of "p and not q" selections registered to be 
explained in our investigation, in the two deontic versions (abstract and 
thematic-obligation), compared to the thematic-permission version, that 
could be interpreted as an indicative rule. In turn, the higher level of correct 
selections obtained in the deontic abstract version, compared with previous 
results from the original abstract version, could be due to, according to the 
authors, that "conditionals in deontic tasks do not have the same logical 
form as ones in "symbolic", "abstract", or "indicative" tasks". (Manktelow 
and Over, 1995, p. 93). 
However, depending on the subjects’ point of view a deontic rule, 
these may select the “p and not q”, “not p and q” or  the  four cards.  This  
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proposal does neither predicts nor explains the high frequency of selection 
that was registered with the "p and q" cards in the deontic abstract task. In 
reality, it is complicated for us to try and analyse how we could incorporate 
the concept of "usefulness" (or preference of the people solving the tasks), 
to be able to explain the results we have obtained. This may be due to, as 
Byrne and Johnson-Laird (1990) observed, that it is the particular way of 
manipulating the instructions performed by the authors which allows the 
subjects’ answers to be justified with regard to their subjective probability. 
This allows for the prediction of the type of concrete alternatives upon 
which the subjects will focus their attention. For Byrne and Johnson-Laird 
(1990), this is an external and unnecessary manipulation to explain the 
process of reasoning itself. 
Byrne and Johnson-Laird (1990) coincide with Manktelow and Over 
in two important questions which explain the subjects’ performance in the 
selection task. On one hand, the type of strategies used by the subjects to 
reason are mental models; on the other, they point out the importance of the 
modal verb incorporated in the wording. Effectively, "the modal verb alerts 
people to the possibility of alternative outcomes" (Byrne & Johnson-Laird, 
1990. p. 142). However, according to these authors this does not imply that 
it is necessary to develop a deontic context to observe facilitation in the 
selection task. In fact, Johnson-Laird and Byrne proposed that "any 
manipulation that draws attention to counter-examples should improve 
peformance even if the materials are not deontic" (1991, pp. 80-81). So, for 
example the manipulation of the instructions may lead the subjects to focus 
their attention on one series of models more than on others; the 
manipulation of the content may make those examples which violate the 
rule more outstanding, and elicit a framework where violations may be 
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According to the authors, precisely when the subjects reason about a 
simple indicative conditional, such as the thematic-permission version 
which we used: "if a person is 18 years old then they have the right to 
vote", they normally tend to represent it at least by way of an explicit model 
(that satisfies the rule’s antecedent and consequent), and an implicit model 
which may or may not occur (meaning that it includes the possibility that 
the antecedent is not fulfilled). However, when the subjects reason about 
deontic enunciatives (e.g. "if a person rides a motorbike then they must 
wear a helmet") then they tend to reason by elaborating a unique mental 
model representing what is allowable. 
According to this proposal, and from the basic principles of the 
theory of mental models, the highest logical indices registered in the 
thematic-obligation version could be explained by way of the lower 
number of mental models which the subjects need to elaborate, which in 
turn causes less strain on operative memory, and consequently brings about 
more correct reasoning. 
Also, in the thematic-permission version, the high frequency of 
selection of "not p and q" is outstanding (21 subjects selected this answer 
compared to 2 who chose it in the other 2 versions). A possible explanation 
suggested by Johnson-Laird and Byrne (1992) about the frequency of 
selection of "not p and q" is that "when the modal auxiliary, "may", occurs 
in the consequent of a conditional of the form: If p occurs then q may occur 
then, given a plausible everyday content, reasoners are likely to construct a 
fully explicit set of models ... and to select the not p and the q cards to test 
the truth of the conditional" (p. 180: our bold text). This same argument 
would be applied to deontic conditionals, although in many cases general    
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knowledge may lead to the development of biconditional interpretations. 
Effectively, in the thematic-permission version ("if a person is older than 
18 then they have the right to vote"), the subjects’ own knowledge could be 
determining the high frequency of selection of the 4 cards (20 subjects used 
this type of selection compared to 6 and 4 who did it in the deontic and 
thematic obligation version, respectively). Specifically, the subject know 
that for a person to vote it is necessary to be 18 or older. This empirical 
knowledge could be allowing for the development of a symmetrical 
interpretation of the relation, and, definitively, increasing the selection of 
"p, not p, q and not q". 
Similarly, the high matching indices registered in the abstract version 
which we used could be explained from Johnson-Laird and Byrne’s (1991, 
1992) perspective, where the majority of the subjects only represent 
explicitly the values mentioned in the rule ("p and q" in our case). In turn, 
depending on its internal representation, the subjects will select "p" or "p 
and q". For example, if they interpret the rule "if a Wasit card has an A on 
one side then it must have a 3 on the other" as a conditional, they will tend 
to only select the "p" card (A), as this would be the only card explicitly 
represented that refers to the truth of the rule. The probability of the 
subjects carrying out the correct selection increases when they develop 
models of the conditional and comprehend the necessity of considering the 
"not q" card to evaluate the rule. 
Also, Evans (1984, 1989) in his framework of the "theory of the 
heuristic-analytic process", proposed that the subjects’ answers are based 
upon a judgement of relevance. According to the author, when the subjects 
reason about the task, they firstly develop a phase of heuristic processing, 
where they selectively look at (or, in Johnson-Laird’s terminology, focus 
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their attention on) certain cards that they consider relevant with regard to 
criteria of a linguistic and/or pragmatic nature. Next they develop a second 
phase of analytic processing, or the real phase of reasoning, that according 
to the author does not always take place. In fact, Evans (1991) suggested 
that the theory of mental models could lay the foundations for his analytical 
study of reasoning, that was, in principle, of a non-specific character. 
Specifically, Evans proposed that when subjects reason about the 
abstract version of the task, the poorness of performance observed depends 
on two factors: the selective decodification of the information of the 
problem from attentional factors, and the absence of satisfactory analytical 
processing. This would explain from his perspective the high indices of 
matching that were registered in the abstract version of the task. Subjects 
would focus their attention on the values mentioned in the rule (A and 3 in 
our case). The values give the linguistic topic of the pronouncement, 
therefore making it more probable that they are catalogued as relevant and 
consequently are more frequently selected. 
Although the highest matching indices were registered in the abstract 
version of the task, we also observed relatively high matching indices in the 
thematic-obligation version, particularly when compared to the other 
thematic version that was used. As Evans and colleagues (1993) proposed, 
the decrease of the matching indices frequently observed when subjects 
reason  about  thematic  versions,  could  be  related  to  the  activation  of 
pragmatic, more than linguistic, clues, that define the relevance of the 
cards, or to the development of the posterior phase of analytical reasoning. 
Our results show that the presence of a thematic content does not always 
reduce or eliminate matching answers. 
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However,  and  perhaps  because  the  relation  expressed  in  the 
thematic-permissive version is less restrictive -or in Margolis’ (1987) 
terms, the scenario is more ambiguous-, the subjects also show a greater 
tendency to develop a reversible interpretation, focusing their attention on 
all the cards. In this sense, the selection pattern "p, not p, q, not q" is 
notably higher than in the other two versions. 
 
C) Effect of the Instructions 
In this experiment, no principal effect was registered by the 
instructions on the logical index, although they did so on the matching 
index. There also exists a significant interaction between instructions and 
content upon the logical index. 
In our case, the significant interactive effect between instructions 
and content, registered in the logical index, appears particularly 
interesting to us. Previous investigations (Griggs, 1984; Chrostowski and 
Griggs, 1985, or Yachanin, 1986), also showed this interactive effect 
between instructions and the content of the problem. Specifically, we 
observed that the V/F instructions facilitated correct performance in the 
thematic-permission version, but not in either the thematic-obligation or the 
abstract versions. In these two deontic versions, higher logical indices 
were registered in the group of subjects who received violation 
instructions for the rule. Likewise, Platt and Griggs (1995) pointed out that 
perhaps "modals in combination with the violation instructions may lead 
subjects to interpret the rules as deontic" (p. 68). 
Platt and Griggs (1995) also registered a high percentage of correct 
selections (around 80%) in the abstract version of the task in a group of 
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subjects who had received violation instructions, when they were presented 
with an explained rule and they were asked for the reasons for their 
answers. These authors presented an interpretation of their results in terms 
of the theory of mental models and of Evan’s heuristic-analytic theory. In 
effect, they suggest that as the selection of cards is normally determined by 
heuristic processes, then certain manipulations may induce in the subjects 
the development of analytical processing, thus improving logical 
performance. Violation instructions appear to increase the possibility of 
developing a falsifying strategy during the analytical processing of the task, 
thus increasing the facilitating effect. When asked for the selection of cards 
which violate the rule, this may cause the subjects to "put more enphasis on 
the not-q card and may make the subject more likely to encode it as 
relevant" (Platt and Griggs, 1995, p. 57). In terms of the theory of mental 
models, the subjects would more easily develop the explicit representation 
of the impossible (in our case, A and 7). 
The results of our experiment support Platt and Grigg’s 
interpretation. This result has allowed us to point out three themes which 
we consider important. Firstly, violation instructions do not always 
improve the subjects’ logical performance. Secondly, this possible 
facilitating effect with violation instructions does not appear to depend, at 
least exclusively, upon the thematic nature of the content of the rule. 
Effectively, we did register better results with violation instructions in a 
thematic version (thematic-obligation); however, this result was not 
maintained in the other thematic version used (thematic-permission).  
Definitively, the presence of a thematic content does not appear to be 
a necessary, or at least sufficient, condition to observe facilitation with 
violation  instructions.  In  fact,  we  registered  better  performance  with  
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violation  instructions  in  the  abstract  version  than  in  the  thematic 
version (thematic-permission), where the subjects received the same type 
of instructions. Therefore, there appear to exist other variables that could be 
modulating this influence. 
Thirdly, and in agreement with Platt and Griggs’ (1995) results, we 
observed that the subjects’ performance in the abstract version of the task 
improved in the group who had received violation instructions, compared 
to instructions for checking the rule. These results differ from those 
observed by other authors (such as Griggs, 1984; Chrostowski and Griggs, 
1985; Valentine, 1985, or Yachanin, 1986, among others), that did not 
register facilitation in the abstract version of the task with violation 
instructions. 
In our study, the instructions and the scenario in which the tasks took 
place were very similar to those used by Griggs (1984) in an investigation 
where he manipulated the role of the instructions (verification/falsification 
vs. violation), and of the content of the task (abstract vs. thematic). In 
Griggs’ study, the subjects’ role was of an inspector on duty. In our case it 
was a lawyer or clerk, depending on the level of accessibility of the 
scenario that was presented. The abstract version used included the same 
deontic conditional rule used by the author. In turn, the thematic version he 
used was that which had been previously used by Griggs and Cox (1982) 
regarding the age when one should be allowed to drink alcoholic 
substances. However, as we have pointed out, our results are different from 
those obtained by the author. 
As Platt and Griggs (1993) suggested, it is possible that the V/F 
instructions enable a tendency to elicit verifying strategies and so to check 
the values that are in accordance with the rule. On the contrary, the 
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violation instructions can increase the tendency to elicit falsifying strategies 
that lead them to analyse the values that violate the rule. In terms of the 
theory of mental models, the subjects who receive violation instructions for 
the rule, should mentally recognise the "non- permissibility" that "p" (A) 
occurs with "not q" (7). These instructions could also determine, in terms of 
the theory of heuristic-analytic and the theory of mental models, the 
relevance of a counterexample via heuristic processes and cause its explicit 
mental representation. 
The tendency to develop non-logical matching strategies could 
perhaps be related, according to Yachanin and Tweney (1982), to the type 
of task that the subjects are asked to carry out. When they are asked to 
analyse if a rule has been violated, this is taken to be true, and they are 
asked, reasoning from this point, to check if it has been violated. However, 
when subjects have to check the truth or falsity of the rule, they are 
reasoning about the rule and analysing its status of truth, and so have to 
study two hypotheses instead of one. Consequently, as shown by Tweney 
and Doherty (1983), the cognitive load is greater and so the complexity of 
the task would increase. This could be one of the reasons that cause 
subjects to develop strategies of a "cognitive short-circuit" (such as the 
matching strategy), thus reducing the number of hypothesis to be 
processed. Given that the cognitive load would be lower in the violation 
version, in this case the tendency to adopt this type of strategy would be 
reduced and would lead the subjects to play a "detective game"  where  
they  would  look  for  counterexamples to the rule (Van Duyne, 1974). 
This perspective would allow the higher matching indices registered with 
V/F instructions to be justified, but not the results, that have already been 
discussed, obtained on the instruction paper in the logical index. 
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In a previous investigation (Valiña, Seoane, Ferraces and Martín, 
1995), whose principal objective was to study the individual differences in 
Wason’s selection task, two types of content were used: thematic (similar 
to our thematic-obligation version) vs. abstract (letters and numbers), and 
two types of instructions: violation and checking of the rule, similar to 
those used by Yachanin (1986). The scenario where the task took place was 
that which had previously been used by Chrostowski and Griggs (1985) 
and Yachanin (1986). In general, the results of this present experiment are 
in line with those registered by the authors of the investigation referred to. 
Significant differences were obtained in both studies in the matching index 
with regard to the type of content, with the highest indices being registered 
in the formal version of the task. Significant effects of the type of 
instructions were also observed in both studies in the matching index; 
precisely, those subjects who received checking instructions for the rule 
registered matching indices superior to those who had to see in which cases 
a violation had been committed. 
In the logical index, significant effects were observed in the content: 
the subjects who carried out the abstract version of the task registered 
lower logical indices compared to those who had received a concrete 
content. In this study we also obtained significant principal effects of the 
task content. When the subjects reasoned about the abstract version, a 
worse logical performance was registered than when they reasoned about 
the thematic-obligation version, whose content, as previously shown, was 
similar to that used by the authors. 
However, Valiña and cols. (1995) registered significantly higher 
logical indices with violation instructions. In this experiment the design 
used, where the type of instructions were manipulated between-group, and 
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the content of the rule within-group, has allowed us to analyse the subjects’ 
performance in the three versions of the task, using, in both the two 
thematic versions and the abstract version, violation instructions and 
instructions for checking the rule. The results obtained do not allow us to 
affirm that the cause of the thematic facilitating effect was the use of 
violation instructions. In fact, as already commented, we did not register 
this effect in the thematic-permission version. 
 
D) Availability Effect 
The logical performance of the subjects did not improve significantly 
with regard to the level of availability of the context in which it took place. 
However, a significant interaction was registered between the availability 
of the scenario and the instructions which the subjects received. Those who 
reasoned about accessible contexts and received instructions for checking 
the rule showed a greater tendency for matching than those subjects who, 
reasoning in the same context, received violation instructions. In turn, in 
the group of subjects who reasoned about non-accessible contexts, higher 
matching indices were registered with those who received violation 
instructions. 
Therefore, the availability of the scenario influenced the group of 
subjects who received checking instructions for the rule, determining the 
relevance of the cards that were mentioned in it (p and q). However, among 
the subjects who reasoned in a non-accessible context, the "p and q" cards 
were  judged  as  relevant  more  often  by  those  who  had  received 
violation instructions. 
Evans (1995) observed that subjects committed a matching bias 
when the task took place without a scenario, and that this bias disappeared    
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in another group of subjects who had been presented the task within a 
scenario. In our case, we only registered significant differences in the 
matching index with regard to availability of scenario in the "thematic-
permission" version. However, the influence of this variable was in turn 
modulated by the type of instructions that were received. In the same way, 
the fact that no significant principal effects were registered in the subjects’ 
performance with regard to the scenario may be due, as Evans indicated, to 
the fact that availability is not a sufficient condition to improve reasoning. 
It is possible that the fact that significantly higher logical indices 
were not registered in an available scenario compared to a non-available 
one is due, as Pollard and Gubbins (1982) suggested, to the rule not being 
perceived as an integral part of the scenario, with the possible effect thus 
being destroyed. It is also possible that the context in which the task 
develops increases the subjects’ tendency to activate their own conceptual 
system and to apply actions which take place in real life, where the subjects 
appear to develop a more pragmatic than logical type of reasoning. 
In reality, the absence of significant differences in logical 
performance between an accessible scenario and a non-accessible one is, up 
to a certain point, expected, if we bear in mind that the manipulation 
carried out in this experiment of the accessibility variable is reduced to the 
introduction into the task of different types of professions, that varied in a 
gradient of accessibility. It is certainly possible that this factor does not 
significantly modulate the subjects’ performance as it does not allow for 
the elaboration of "mental framework that is actively transformed, with the  
intention of deriving its factual and plausible consequences from the 
"mental simulation" mode" (Valiña and De Vega, 1988, p. 58). 
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As Johnson-Laird & Byrne has pointed out, "the content of the 
premises can exert a profound effect on the conclusions that people draw, 
and so a uniform procedure for extracting logical form and applying 
formal rules to it may not account for all aspects of performance" (1991,  
p. 35). The results of our experiment allow us to move away from those 
formal perspectives which characterise human reasoning as a syntactic type 
of reasoning, based on the activation of logical rules of an abstract nature 
and of a universal character. 
Some of the results obtained may be explained within the framework 
of the theory of pragmatic reasoning schemas. Others, such as the presence 
of matching bias in the subjects’ selections, are difficult to explain within 
this theoretical framework. On the contrary, Evans’ (1984; 1989) theory of 
heuristic-analytic processes and Johnson-Laird’s theory of mental models 
(1983); Johnson-Laird and Byrne (1991) develop a detailed explanation 
about the causes which cause subjects to commit matching bias, and in 
general about the principal phenomena observed in the subjects’ 
performance in the selection task. Therefore, both theories appear to be the 
most attractive candidates for explaining the results we obtained in this 
experiment. 
Clearly, the subjects, when reasoning, appear to be elaborating 
mental representations both from the information contained in the premises 
and from their knowledge of the world. In turn, it is possible that they may 
develop preconscious strategies that lead them to focus their attention on 
certain cards which, as we observed, are not necessarily the "correct" ones. 
This selective attention or this judgement of relevance towards certain 
selections,  appears  to  be  modulated  by  the  type  of  variables  that  are  
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manipulated. These could be outlining what has to be explicitly 
represented, and / or what must be submitted to a later phase of analytical 
processing. In this respect, as the authors of the theory of mental models 
suggested, any manipulation which leads to the development of the models 
of the conditional with explicit representations of the false consequent, will 
tend to produce an insight about the task. However, as Love and Kessler 
(1995) suggested, the obvious question is what type of manipulation or 
manipulations may reach this objective. 
Within the framework of mental models theory, Johnson-Laird and 
Byrne (1992); Byrne and Johnson-Laird (1992) offer a detailed explanation 
of the differences in the subjects’ performance when they reason about 
indicative conditional pronouncements that are "probable", compared to 
deontic conditionals which present a character of "necessity". According to 
the authors, the number of mental models which the subjects need to 
elaborate to be able to generate the conclusion, is less in the case of deontic 
conditionals, and in consequence, the reasoning will be better. In effect, we 
registered a more correct logical achievement when the subjects reasoned 
about deontic conditional rules. The question is: How may our results be 
generalised to other types of tasks closer to the subjects’ daily lives? 
The results we obtained in this experiment only allow us to establish 
conclusions within the framework of a metainference task, like the 
selection task. However, as Johnson-Laird proposed (1995), the phenomena 
observed in the subjects’ performance in Wason’s task have little 
psychological justification outside of the selection task. 
Our interest in studying the importance of knowledge in the subjects’ 
daily reasoning, with tasks of conditional inference, as well as going into 
the differences in the subjects’ performance with conditional tasks 
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expressing relations of need and possibility, have led us propose another 
experiment. In this study (Valiña, Seoane, Ferraces and Martín, 1996), the 
subjects were presented with conditional arguments, of the four types of 
rules of propositional logic, where the distinct probability of empirical 
occurrence of the relation expressed between antecedent and consequent 
was manipulated, in agreement with previous investigations (Valiña and 
colleagues, 1992a and b). The results of this experiment confirmed our 
predictions, as the subjects’ reasoning was influenced both by the type of 
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